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Abstract: Public–private partnership (PPP) is such a hot concept that nowadays it is discussed 
everywhere be it a public sector management journal or a public sector management conference. 
Governments subject to severe fiscal pressure in developing countries like China, where PPP law is 
not in place yet, regard it as a panacea or fixed solution for infrastructure development. This paper 
hence attempts to provide reference to this point by investigating the Beijing National Stadium. 
There was a significant change in the Project Company on 20 August 2009. Three main reasons for 
the contract change were (1) wrong identification of the retractable roof as one of the output 
specifications, (2) adoption of PPP without a careful feasibility study and (3) strong government 
interference like suspension of selling name-right and prohibition of holding small-scale or small 
events. It was found that PPP would not be more appropriate than conventional procurement in this 
project. It was therefore proved that PPP is not a panacea for infrastructure development. It is 
expected that a review of the Beijing National Stadium can provide valuable information for when 
and how to implement PPPs. More considerations on receiving value for money in the whole project 
lifecycle (including the operation) should be taken in a PPP project. 
 




Public–private partnership (PPP) is a joint working arrangement between the public and private 
sectors to deliver policies, services and infrastructure (HM Treasury 2011). In a typical PPP 
arrangement, a group of private investors finance and manage the construction of projects, maintain 
and operate facilities for a long period and at the end of the concession period transfer facilities to the 
government (Tieva & Junnonen 2009). The use of PPP to involve private sector investment in the 
public provision of infrastructure has become common in recent years (Chan et al. 2010a). Projects 
that require large upfront investments, such as highways, urban rails, bridges, water and sewage 
treatment plants, are now usually provided via PPP modality (Engel et al. 2010). 
 
With the continuous economic growth in China, the demand for infrastructures is increasing. To 
meet the growing development needs, the Chinese government has been proactive in promoting 
private involvement and investment in the infrastructure development. At the executive meeting of 
the State Council on 31 July 2013, Premier Keqiang Li stated that the government will continuously 
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support private investment and various investment entities will be treated equally. The central 
government also claimed to further widen market access of public services to eligible private 
investors with sound credit (Xinhuanet 2013). It is expected that private investors would get more 
involved in infrastructure development via PPP mode. 
 
However, it is worth highlighting that PPP is not a panacea or a quick fix solution to deliver project 
financing and realization (UNIDO 1996; European Commission 2003; Chen 2009). It has been 
criticized for the high-risk exposure, lengthy delays in negotiation and project accountability 
concerns (Chan et al. 2010a). As an emerging PPP country, the regulatory and institutional 
frameworks for PPP in China are still not mature and are evolving (Chan et al. 2010a). There is 
currently no guidance for value for money assessment mechanism to ensure that PPP is the most 
appropriate option. Because of the great pressure on the government’s budget for infrastructure 
development, the need for infrastructure to be developed may usually override concerns around the 
efficiency of its development and operation. The decision to adopt PPP would then be made despite 
the specific conditions of the target project. The government officials make decision based on their 
own judgments or preferences, while the public society, including professionals or academicians, has 
little influence on the decision-making (Sachs et al. 2007; Ke et al. 2012). In response to this issue, 
this paper aims to investigate when a PPP is the best option and how PPP should be done. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
PPP has been popularly used in infrastructure development worldwide. Infrastructures are of two 
types: economic infrastructures (e.g., roads, tunnels, bridges) and social infrastructures (e.g., 
hospitals, schools, prisons). Economic infrastructures denote a subset of infrastructures that are 
characterized by demand-based revenue streams, while social infrastructures are those that typically 
include assets accommodating social services. 
 
PPP is less difficult to apply in economic infrastructures that are financially more attractive to private 
investors (Jefferies & McGeorge 2009). There is extensive literature investigating all kinds of issues 
in different sectors. For example, Lee and Yu (2011) studied the service delivery on household 
connections in Taiwan’s sewer PPP projects, Sharma and Nayak (2013) developed an isodynamic 
model in PPP water management, Meduri and Annamalai (2013) compared the unit costs of public 
and PPP road projects in India and Ashuri et al. (2012) proposed a risk-neutral pricing approach for 
evaluating PPP highway projects. 
 
The PPP model was first used for social public projects like schools, hospitals and prisons in the 
United Kingdom, Australia and United States. Over the years, these projects have further expanded 
to include sports arenas, art and exhibition facilities, colleges for higher education, etc. (Hodge & 
Greve 2005). Some specific examples of social PPP projects are the Victoria Dock Primary School, 
which was the first private finance initiative (a form of PPP) school built in the United Kingdom 
(Gibson & Davies 2008), and the Asia World Expo in Hong Kong. The success of these projects 
widened the scope of using PPP (Chan et al. 2010b). The continuous use of the PPP model for social 
projects has demonstrated that this arrangement could also be very successful in achieving the 
targeted outcomes (Malone 2005). 
 
Given that the driving force for private investors in a PPP is to obtain a reasonable investment return, 
it is understandable that the government needs to make social PPPs more attractive to the private 
investors. Otherwise, the private investors may be deterred by the high transaction costs and low 
operation revenue of social PPPs (Curnow et al. 2005). This is in direct contrast to the available 
opportunities in economic PPP projects (Jefferies & McGeorge 2009). 
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There are many other problems/disadvantages as well with PPP projects: (1) The impact of risks 
(arising from multiple sources including the political, social, technical, economic and environmental 
factors) to project objectives in completing a PPP project is usually significant (Koppenjan 2005). (2) 
PPP projects often require extensive expertise input and take long time in deal negotiation (Li et al. 
2005). (3) PPP in public projects typically face political and social issues such as land resumption, 
employment, heritage and environmental protection, which could result in public opposition, over-
blown costs and delays in the projects (Li et al. 2005). (4) Success in finding financially strong 
partners in a PPP project is considered difficult, especially where there is a lack of mature financial 
engineering techniques (Grimsey & Lewis 2004). 
 
3. Gap in knowledge 
 
In countries like the United Kingdom, Australia and Hong Kong, there are detailed PPP guides, 
which clearly indicate the procedure and method to evaluate the value for money for PPP and 
traditional delivery. In Hong Kong for example, in the early stages, when it might not be clear 
whether a PPP or another delivery option will be the best option to resolve the issues, a business case 
will often be handled in two stages: stage 1 and stage 2. Stage 1 business case study involves a high 
level selection from different delivery options, and stage 2 business case study includes a detailed 
analysis of the costs, benefits and risks of the PPP option to the government, critical success factors, 
procurement strategy, risk management strategy, etc. (Efficiency Unit 2008). 
 
In China, however, laws and regulations especially for those related to PPP are still not mature and 
are evolving (Chen 2009). There is currently no guidance for value for money assessment or other 
mechanisms to ensure that a PPP is the optimal financial option (Chan et al. 2010a). The government 
officials usually make decisions based on their own judgments or preferences, while the public 
society, including professionals or academicians, has little or negligible influence on the decision 
(Sachs et al. 2007; Ke et al., 2012). Under such circumstances, many local governments consider 
PPP as a quick fix solution to deliver infrastructures. The problem is that the adoption of PPP in an 
infrastructure project, especially a social infrastructure project with less financial attractiveness, may 
lead to a failure when it is not the best procurement option. This paper hence attempts to investigate 
the appropriateness of PPP adoption in the infrastructure development in China by a case study. 
 
4. Research method 
 
Case study can be an effective research approach for learning lessons from front-line projects and 
providing management implications to future infrastructure investors (Yin 2002). Therefore, a case 
study would be adopted in this paper to prove the viewpoint that PPP is not a quick fix solution to 
deliver infrastructures as well as to obtain lessons of when and how to adopt PPP in the infrastructure 
development in China. 
 
The Beijing National Stadium is not only one of the most remarkable sport facilities in the world, but 
also the first PPP sport facility in China and it is therefore worth investigating this project. Another 
reason for choosing the Beijing National Stadium as a case study for this paper is that there was a 
significant change in the Project Company on 20 August 2009. The Beijing Municipal Government 
now has a 58% stake in the company and directly takes the lead of operation management. Instead of 
having a 30-year of exclusive concession period, the China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation (CITIC) Consortium became a permanent stakeholder with a 42% shareholding 
(National Stadium 2009). In light of the transfer of main stakeholder in this project from private 
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consortium to government, it is hence expected that a review of the Beijing National Stadium can 
provide valuable information for when and how to implement PPPs. 
 




Nowadays Olympics Games is no longer a sports event but also an urban regeneration effort. Many 
international cities showed great enthusiasm in bidding for hosting the Olympics, hoping to solve 
urban problems and boost growth in a short term (Hiller 2000). However, there were much higher 
stakes in Beijing’s bid and preparations for the Olympics. It became a national event and a symbolic 
showcase through which the central government of China intended to demonstrate to the world the 
country’s economic achievements (Ren 2008). It was in this context that the need to build a national 
stadium appeared. 
 
Public interest in the Beijing National Stadium fell at two levels (Liu et al. 2010): project level and 
state level. At the project level, the design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the 
project could be carried out in accordance with the demands of hosting the games. On the other hand, 
at the state level, the project was expected to emphasize Chinese creativity in the organization and 
management of the games. It was hoped that the stadium would become a landmark and milestone 
project, which would help in both accelerating the modernization of Beijing and promoting national 
economic development. It could be seen that the Beijing National Stadium project was not only a 
municipal project in Beijing but also an important event in the whole country that attracted great 
attention of the central government and the public. 
 
5.2 Project development process 
 
The operation and maintenance of a sport facility is always a critical issue. The fact that many sports 
facilities for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games were developed via PPP reflected the Chinese 
government’s belief that such facilities could be built and operated more efficiently that way (Liu et 
al. 2010). However, unlike a normal PPP project, Beijing Municipal Government (BMG) entrusted 
the Beijing Municipal Development Planning Commission (BMDPC, currently known as Beijing 
Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, BMCDR) to conduct the biddings for the 
design and concession of the stadium at the same time in October 2002. The detailed milestones of 
the development process are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 Figure 1: Development process of the Beijing National Stadium 
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As shown in Figure 1, a two-stage competitive bidding was adopted for the procurement of 
concession. There were seven consortia applying for the pre-qualification in February 2003, of which 
five were qualified and entered the second round of bidding in April 2003 (National Stadium 2011a). 
Of these five, the top two successful bidders in the second round in the early July 2003 were Beijing 
Construction Engineering Group (BCEG) consortium and the CITIC consortium. A comprehensive 
evaluation method was adopted, which took into account optimized architectural design plan, 
construction plan, financing plan, operation plan, financial analysis, insurance plan, transfer plan and 
responses to contract document with a weighting of 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 5%, 5%, 5% and 15% 
(Zhou 2011). 
 
The BCEG consortium was most likely to be awarded the concession, as it was ranked first. 
However, it dropped out in the late July 2003 as a result of failure to reach a common agreement 
with the BMG. The BMG then had to negotiate quickly with the CITIC Consortium (which was the 
second ranked bidder) from 2 August 2003 (Jing & Wang 2008), and the two signed the concession 
agreement on 9 August 2003. It could be easily understood that the tight negotiation between the 
BMG and the CITIC Consortium would result in a rushed and imperfect agreement that left several 
unsolved issues for further negotiation and these led to many future problems (Liu et al 2010). 
 
5.3 Project partners and structure 
 
The major project structure of the Beijing National Stadium project is shown in Figure 2. On the 
same day when the concession agreement was signed, the CITIC Consortium also signed the 
National Stadium Agreement with the BMG and the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of 
the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) as well as the Joint Operation Contract with the Beijing State-Owned 
Assets Management Co., Ltd. (BSAM). The project company National Stadium Co., Ltd. (NSC) was 
set up later in September 2003, which was made up of the BSAM having a 58% investment in the 
stadium and the CITIC Consortium with a 42% share of investment. It is worth noting that the 
BSAM was not to take a lead in the construction and management of the stadium and was also not to 
share any revenue within the concession period of 30 years (Zhou 2011). This meant that the BSAM 
was not responsible for the 58% of maintenance cost. 
 
The CITIC Consortium was composed of three companies: the CITIC Group, the Beijing Urban 
Construction Group (BUCG) and the Golden State Holding Group (GSHG). The proportional equity 
of the three companies in the consortium was 65%, 30% and 5%, respectively. The main area of 
expertise of the state-owned CITIC group lay in finance, industry and other service-related domains. 
The BUCG, also a state-owned group, had its hands in many areas of construction industry. GSHG, 
the only private partner, was established in the United States and invested in several water, sewage 
and waste management plants in China. 
 
The Sino-Swiss Design Consortium, which included Swiss architecture firm Herzog de Meuron, 
ARUP Consulting Company, and China Architecture Design and Research Group, won the design 
bid through the international competitive bidding. Yet, the selection of other partners was not via 
bidding or negotiation. The main contractor was BUCG, one of the shareholders in the Consortium. 
The subcontractors were CITIC International Contracting Inc. and CITIC Guoan Group, subsidiary 
companies of the CITIC Group. China CITIC Bank was one of the loan lenders. 
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 Figure 2: Project structure of the Beijing National Stadium 
 
5.4 Construction of the stadium 
 
In December 2003, the construction of the Beijing National Stadium broke ground in order to keep 
up the momentum of the preparations for the Olympics, even though architects were still working on 
preliminary design drawings (Ren 2008). As per the Concession Agreement, the construction of the 
stadium was to be completed by the end of 2006, but it actually got completed on 28 June 2008. The 
total construction cost was RMB 3.596 billion, which overran by 0.456 billion (National Audit 
Office 2009). Although in the end it got completed with good quality and safety measures – and 
played an important role in facilitating the success of the 2008 Beijing Olympics Games – the 
construction process of the stadium was not quite smooth. 
 
In July 2004, 7 months after the stadium’s ground breaking, the BMG ordered to stop the 
construction. The official reason cited by the BOCOG for this decision was that readjustments were 
needed in the architectural design and also to emphasize the idea of a cost-friendly Olympics 
(National Stadium 2007a). The key issue of the suspension was the safety and cost of the retractable 
roof. By the end of November 2004, the design work adjustments were complete. The plan to have a 
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retractable roof was abandoned, thus reducing the percentage of steel originally needed by 22.3% 
and lowering the overall membrane structure by 13% (National Stadium 2007b). The construction 
was thereafter resumed in December 2004. 
 
However, one of the few specific requirements for the conceptual design of the stadium by the 
BMDPC was that the stadium “shall have a retractable roof, with the configuration designed to fully 
reflect the characteristics of modern sports buildings” (Ren 2008). The retractable roof became the 
focus for both architects in their design process and for bid evaluation committee members in their 
evaluation (ChinaVR 2003). The government later ordered the retractable roof to be removed to cut 
down the cost. This obviously wasted significant amounts of public and private sectors’ time and 
money in the procurement stage, as the government should not have proposed the idea of a 
retractable roof in the bid invitation. The design change was criticized as evidence of the 
government’s inconsistent decision-making process (Ren 2008). 
 
5.5 Operation of the stadium 
 
A sport facility project could be defined as a social infrastructure project in which the financial 
rewards are less and the operational demands are more complex than for economic PPP projects 
(Jefferies & McGeorge 2009). It was more so for the National Stadium because of its extremely high 
construction cost and maintenance cost. Overall, the operation of the stadium was disappointing. On 
20 August 2009, the BMG and the CITIC Consortium signed the Agreement on Further 
Strengthening the Operation, Maintenance and Management of the National Stadium to carry out a 
shareholding reform of the NSC. With this, the BSAM took the lead of operation management and 
the CITIC Consortium became a permanent stakeholder with a 42% shareholding (National Stadium 
2009). 
 
One of the reasons for the operation failure of the Beijing National Stadium was the significant 
change in business design and realization. Table 1 lists out the business design and its realization in 
the operation period. The planned revenue sources included sports events (i.e., lease for football 
games, lease for track and field competitions and lease for warm-up facilities), art and culture events, 
lease for corporate suites, advertisement, naming right, exhibition and tourism and souvenir shops. 
Among these, lease for corporate suites, art and culture events, and tourism and souvenir shops were 
supposed to be the principal income channels. It is worth noting that the revenue of lease for 
corporate suites and advertisement highly depends on the frequency of sports, art and culture events. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the use of stadium for sports, art and culture events has been low. One of the 
reasons for this could be that the extremely high rent cost (about RMB 5–10 million) would scare 
away many possible event organizers (Liu 2010). Another reason is that the Beijing National 
Stadium is not only a sport stadium, but also a public symbol with high degree of political 
complexion. Therefore, to maintain its image in the public, the stadium could not hold low-grade or 
small events (Hu 2009; Liu 2010). Thereafter, there were also concerns about the market of 
corporate suites for long term lease because of the low frequency of sport, art, and culture events in 




According to the English website of National Stadium Co., Ltd. (2011b), there are three levels of 
corporate sponsorship: supporting business, corporate partner and title sponsor. It was reported that 
the first phase of partnership negotiations on the Beijing National Stadium had been completed by 
August 2008 with 13–14 enterprises selected and the cooperation revenue reached more than RMB 
100 million (Du 2008). The second phase of partnership was also launched by the National Stadium 
Co., Ltd., to negotiate with up to seven domestic and overseas enterprises over title right (naming 
right) in August 2008 (Du 2008). However, it was later suspended by the BMG. Although stadium 
naming rights are an important source of income for big stadiums in countries with a strong sports 
industry, it would not happen in Beijing, where the Beijing National Stadium is a symbol of national 
aspirations (Huang 2009; Li 2009a). It is interesting to know that the name of Beijing National 
Stadium would not be commercialized but naming rights of other facilities within the stadium, such 
as the 84 executive boxes, may be considered for commercial branding (Ju 2011). 
 
On the other hand, the revenue from tourism and souvenir shops has greatly beyond the expectation. 
It was reported that the income from the sale of tickets within 8 months after the Olympics reached 
RMB 260 million, which was about 70% of the total revenue (Li 2009b). But the ticket price has 
been accused as being too high (Li 2008), and the tourist revenue could not be sustained as the 
Olympic Games fever faded away (Li 2009b). 
 
5.6 Project performance analysis 
 
Given that the information is from the publicly available information in the news, websites, 
publications, etc., the objective of this section is not to obtain an accurate evaluation analysis but to 
discover the gain and loss of the government using PPP model from the view of public 
accountability. 
 
In general, compared to a traditional project, the differences in the cash flow in a PPP project include 
a higher procurement cost, a later start of construction, a lower operation/maintain cost and a higher 
operation income, and it is like this because the private investors are supposed to bring in higher 
operation efficiency when investing in a PPP project (Yuan et al. 2010). This also how both the 
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public and private partners could achieve a win–win result. In addition, the adoption of PPP model 
could reduce government investment at the start of the project and postpone the annual investment as 
well, which provide possibilities for the government to optimize the structure of budgetary 
expenditures (Cheung et al. 2010). 
 
In the case of Beijing National Stadium, the BMG rushed the procurement process in order to 
commence the construction in late 2003. The construction did not start late, but with a cost of very 
tight contract negotiation. The stadium was planned to be completed by the end of 2006 but actually 
got completed on 28 June 2008. The total construction cost was RMB 3.596 billion, which overran 
by RMB 0.456 billion (National Audit Office 2009). 
 
The purpose of improving operation efficiency was not accomplished at all as evident from the 
disappointing operation performance. It is highly possible that the project company could not make 
enough profits to cover the high investment. The contract change on 20 August 2009 made the 
private investors the permanent stakeholder and thereafter solved their problem. The private 
investors are now actually in the best economic position. 
 
The purpose of optimizing the budgetary expenditure structure was partly achieved. After the 
contract change on 20 August 2009, the BSAM on behalf of the BMG was responsible for the 58% 
of maintenance cost. In other words, the BMG invested 58% of construction cost during the 
construction period from end 2003 to June 2008, and shared 58% of maintenance cost from 1 year 
later. The adoption of PPP model in this project apparently did not greatly improve the budgetary 




Seemingly, PPP has become a more and more popular financing modality in China’s infrastructure 
development. However, the legal framework for PPP implementation is not in place yet. In 
particular, PPP selection and design will vary depending on the specific conditions of the target 
project and the negotiation between government and private investors (Chen 2009). There is 
currently no guidance for value for money assessment or other mechanisms to ensure that PPP is the 
optimal financial option (Chan et al. 2010a). This may be ascribed to China’s ongoing shift from a 
central to a market economy and the rapid pace of economic growth, where the growing demand for 
infrastructure to be developed may override concerns around the efficiency of its development and 
operation. Although a feasibility study and post-evaluation for a PPP project in China is typically 
conducted, information relevant to appraisal, project details and post-implementation is usually not 
publicized. There is no formal process for deciding on the type and extend of government support for 
PPPs (Wang et al. 2010). The government officers usually make decisions based on their own 
judgments or preferences, while the public society, including professionals and academicians, have 
little (or negligible) influence on the decision (Ke et al., 2012). 
 
6.1 Financial modality selection 
 
In this case, the most important question is whether a PPP was the most optimal financial option for 
the Beijing National Stadium. It is evident that the feasibility of adopting the PPP approach was not 
assessed before the BMG issued the invitation of bidding. The BMG rushed the procurement process 
in order to commence the construction in late 2003. Thereafter, the BMG negotiated very quickly 
with the CITIC Consortium on 2 August 2003 and signed the Concession Agreement on 9 August 
2003 (Jing & Wang 2008). 
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In the absence of receiving value for money, the government should reconsider whether to continue 
with the PPP approach. As the principal driver for the private investors participating in a PPP project 
is to make profits, the only way to achieve a win–win result is improvement in construction and 
operation quality, reduction of construction and operation cost or improvement of efficiency (Yuan 
et al. 2010). However, the involvement of the CITIC Consortium did not bring in such an 
improvement. The CITIC Consortium also did not present an active attitude and innovative ability in 
creating revenue sources. In all conscience, the public image and government interference in selling 
naming rights and hosting small scale events was another cause of the disappointing operation 
performance. 
 
The only benefit of adopting PPP in the National Stadium has been that the BMG could save quite a 
lot of investment at the special time, when it was about to construct many stadiums and improve the 
infrastructures for the coming 2008 Beijing Olympics. This may be the main driving force for the 
BMG to implement PPP. 
 
In light of the discussion, PPP was obviously not the best option to procure Beijing National Stadium 
because of its high construction and maintenance cost, low revenue stream and great symbolic 
meaning. 
 
6.2 Government’s decision-making 
 
Another significant problem in the case of Beijing National Stadium was the decision-making of the 
BMG, especially on the transparency and accountability of decision-making process and 
consequence. It is believed that the government officials now in China usually make decision based 
on their own judgments or preferences (Ke et al., 2012). Particularly in this project, the problematic 
and inconsistent decisions of the BMG included wrong identification of the retractable roof as one of 
the output specifications, suspension of selling name right and prohibition of holding small-scale or 
small events. 
 
Retractable roof was one of the specific requirements for the conceptual design of the National 
Stadium (ChinaVR 2003) because the officials believed that “the stadium with a retractable roof will 
turn out to be a significant architectural legacy of the 2008 Olympics” (Ren 2008). The retractable 
roof became the focus in the 13 potential designs. Engineering firms were hired by architectural 
teams to design a safe and cost-effective roof. All of these efforts turned out to be an exercise in 
futility as the BMG later removed the retractable roof (Ren 2008). The driving force for the BMG to 
make such a huge change was a petition letter submitted to the Chinese prime minister from four 
senior members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in July 2004. The petitioners criticized that the 
design of the National Stadium had potential problems in safety and stability. The BMG therefore 
suspended the construction and conducted a financial review. The suspension of construction and the 
following design change had greatly confused the public (Xinhuanet 2004a, 2004b). Why were the 
safety and stability problems not discovered during the long procurement period? Why did the BMG 
list the retractable roof as one of the output specifications? 
 
6.3 Difficulties for adopting PPP in social facilities 
 
Social infrastructure projects like sport facilities are characterized as generally being smaller in scale 
than economic infrastructure projects such as toll roads, power plants or water plants and, by their 
nature, also tend to be complex, particularly in terms of ongoing involvement with the community 
(Jefferies & McGeorge 2009). The same situation is also seen in England’s National Health Service, 
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where the private financing of public capital investment is highly problematic and can have a serious 
impact on the finances and capacity of public authorities (Hellowell & Pollock 2010). 
 
Considerations for adopting PPP in a social infrastructure would therefore at least include the 
following: first, to proceed with the PPP model would mean that the project would be further delayed 
due to the long tendering and negotiation processes; second, with private sector involvement there 
would be a lack of government control over the project during the concession period; third, the 
business model would not be economically attractive enough for the private sector to be interested 
(Cheung & Chan 2009). 
 
However, it does not mean that PPP is always a bad choice to procure social infrastructure. Social 
PPPs can still significantly reduce construction time and reduce net present costs as long as 
contracting parties would pay much attention on non-value-added transaction costs, such as legal 
fees in the PPP bidding process (Jefferies & McGeorge 2009), risks are properly identified and 
allocated to the parties best able to carry the risk (Cooper et al. 2005) and much transparency both in 
terms of the costs and decision-making would be in place. In other words, the experience and 
knowledge of contracting parties especially the government, as well as an advanced legal framework, 




PPP has been popularly used worldwide. Many local governments have regarded it as a panacea for 
infrastructure development. This paper has studied the much-speculated case of the Beijing National 
Stadium for 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. The findings showed that there were several reasons 
that led to the case being procured back by the government. First, the BMG simply believed that the 
stadium with a retractable roof would be a significant architectural legacy of the 2008 Olympics, and 
identified it as one of the output specifications in the invitation of bidding, which was actually 
against the theme of Green Olympics for the Beijing Olympics. Second, the BMG adopted PPP in 
this project without a careful feasibility study, which was later proved as not the best procurement 
method. Lack of transparency in the government’s decision-making also resulted in the public 
suspicion on the high entry price and service. Third, the strong government interference in the 
project like suspension of selling name right and prohibition of holding small-scale or small events 
caused a great change of income sources, which made it more difficult for project company to 
recover its investment. All these reasons clearly indicate that PPP model was not a better option for 
the Beijing National Stadium than the conventional procurement. 
 
Therefore, PPP is not a panacea or fixed solution for infrastructure development, especially for social 
facilities, which are usually smaller in scale than economic infrastructure projects and also tend to be 
complex. It is more difficult to adopt PPP in social infrastructures than in economic infrastructures. 
The experience and knowledge of contracting parties, especially the government, as well as an 
advanced legal framework (e.g., how to choose a best procurement method and how to make 
decisions) are required for the successful implementation of PPP in social infrastructures. 
 
The contribution of this paper is that the arrangement and performance of a large PPP sport project is 
analyzed and the problem areas scrutinized. The significance of this paper is that in future public 
clients who want to procure large-scale projects in developing countries like China via PPP model 




One limitation of this paper is that the actual financial data during operation is not accessible due to 
its commercial-in-confidence nature. Structured interviews could not be conducted either given that 
this unsuccessful case study is not anonymous and individual interviewee could then be possibly 
identified. Therefore, this paper based its case study on the publicly available information of 
construction and operation performance in the news, websites, publications, etc. Another possible 
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